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 Water – South Sudan 
This report has been made by the African Studies Centre in Leiden for VIA Water, 
Programme on water innovation in Africa, initiated by the Netherlands Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs. It is accompanied by an ASC web dossier about recent publications on 
water in South Sudan (see www.viawater.nl), compiled by Germa Seuren of the ASC 
Library under the responsibility of Jos Damen. The South Sudan report is the result of 
joint work by Marcel Rutten, Ton Dietz and Fenneken Veldkamp. Blue texts indicate the 
impact of the factual (e.g. demographic, economic or agricultural) situation on the 
water sector in the country. The authors used (among other sources) the web dossier on 
Water in South Sudan and the Africa Yearbook 2013 chapter about South Sudan, written 
by Peter Woodward. Also the Country Portal on South Sudan, organized by the ASC 
Library, has been a rich source of information (see http://countryportal.ascleiden.nl).1 
©Leiden: African Studies Centre; September 2014 
Political geography of water 
The Republic of South Sudan is a landlocked country in east-central Africa. It 
covers an area of 619,745 km2, or about one third the size of Western Europe. Its 
current capital is Juba, which is also its largest city; however the capital city is 
planned to be changed, possibly to the more centrally located Ramciel, or to the 
city of Wau in the north-west. South Sudan is bordered by Ethiopia to the east, 
Kenya to the southeast, Uganda to the south, the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo to the southwest, the Central African Republic to the west and the Repub-
lic of Sudan to the north. Some of the northern areas are still disputed by Sudan 
and South Sudan, after they split (http://countryportal.ascleiden.nl/south-sudan).  
 
Source: CIA World Factbook  
                                                 
1 The report has been realized on the basis of short-term desk research and makes no claim of being  
definitive, complete or scientifically substantiated. 
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A note on the history of this young state. On 9 July 2011, the Republic of South 
Sudan became the world’s newest country. The realisation of the South’s inde-
pendence came after nearly four decades of civil war that devastated the lives and 
livelihoods of the South Sudanese. The consequences of the long conflict on 
people’s lives, livelihoods and access to basic services were devastating, and the 
new country faces massive challenges in overcoming these.  Some 2 million peo-
ple were killed in the conflict, and twice that many were displaced - either inter-
nally or internationally as refugees. These groups have been returning to South 
Sudan since 2005 when the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) was signed, 
making return and reintegration one of the major policy concerns of the new 
government in Juba. But the war also took a heavy toll on the lives and liveli-
hoods of those who were not displaced, or who were displaced locally. Liveli-
hood recovery has begun across South Sudan in spite of new (internal) clashes 
(particularly Abyei) and conflicts with Sudan over borders and oil transport. Be-
yond the lingering conflicts, several major factors impinge on livelihood recov-
ery. The first of these is rapid urbanisation, especially among youth, males and 
returnee populations. The second is a major influx of foreigners after the war, 
looking for economic opportunity (Maxwell et al. 2012). In the southeast of the 
county the so-called Ilemi triangle officially belongs to South Sudan, but is under 
the administration of Kenya, that treats it (and its oil and groundwater wealth) as 
part of Kenya. Here we also find (part of) the transboundary Lake Turkana basin 
(14,564 km2) comprising 2.35% of South Sudan territory. The remainder all be-
longs to the Nile basin (622,170 km2 or 97.65%).  
 
 
Figure 1 Nile basin     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: http://www.eeescience.utoledo.edu/Faculty/Becker/images/Nile_Basin.jpg 
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The river Nile is the world’s longest river of some 6,800 km. From Khartoum 
(Sudan) downstream it combines its two main tributaries, i.e., the White Nile 
(originating from Rwanda/Burundi and totalling 3,700 km) and the Blue Nile 
(whose headwater are in lake Tana, Ethiopia; totalling 1,450 km) - and includes 
the following 11 riparian countries: Rwanda, Burundi, Democratic Republic of 
the Congo (DRC), Tanzania, Kenya, Uganda, Ethiopia, Eritrea, South Sudan, 
Sudan and Egypt. 
Although the White Nile is considered to be the primary stream of the Nile it 
is the Blue Nile that carries most of the water. An estimated 28 billion cubic me-
ters, representing 30% of the flow of Nile water, passes through South Sudan to 
Sudan and on to Egypt. Three major South Sudanese tributaries meet and flow 
into the White Nile: the Bahr el-Ghazal (comprising three sub-basins of Kiir, Loll 
and Jur); the Bahr el-Jebel (comprising numerous tributaries such as Yei, Aswa 
and Kiit); and the River Sobat (comprising sub-basins such as Pibor, Akobo-
Baro).  
 
 
Figure 2 South Sudan Rivers      
 
source: AfDB 2013 
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Figure 3 South Sudan surface waters 
 
Source: AfDB 2013 
 
 
About 50% of the flow into the White Nile is lost in the wetlands of South Su-
dan, due primarily to evaporation and transpiration. For example, The Bahr el 
Ghazal basin, which discharges about 12 billion m3 per annum, looses 11.4 bil-
lion m3 per annum of its flow to the Sudd wetland (see below). So although 
South Sudan has substantial water resources, these are unevenly distributed 
across the region and vary considerably from year to year. (North and South) Su-
dan’s total natural renewable water resources are estimated to be 149 km3/year, 
of which 80% (119km3) flows over the borders from upstream countries, and 
only 20% is produced internally from rainfall (appr. 30 km3/yr) (UNEP 2007). 
Updated total renewable water resources for South Sudan have become available 
recently and put it at 49.5 km3/year. This translates in a 2012 per capita availa-
bility of about 4,567 m3/cap/yr. This reliance on externally generated surface 
waters is a key feature of Sudan’s water resources. The share of water generated 
from rainfall is erratic and prone to drought spells. In dry years, internal water 
resources fall dramatically, in severe cases down to 15% of the annual average. 
This hydrologic variability, coupled with no investment in storage structures, has 
made South Sudan hostage to periodic floods and droughts (African Develop-
ment Bank, AfDB 2013). 
South Sudan is also home to the world’s largest swamp, the Sudd, which co-
vers 30,000 km2. When high river discharges occur, water spills over the banks 
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of rivers and floods large areas of flat land lying below the river banks creating 
swamps with an area of approximately 3 million ha (1.4 million ha are seasonal 
and the remaining 1.6 million ha are permanent wetland). Not all the water dis-
charged into the swamp areas flows out, creating this permanent swamp and giv-
ing the region its name: Sudd (meaning barrier/blockage in Arabic). The Sudd 
has been declared a Ramsar site. The swamps, floodplains and grassland contain 
over 350 species of plants, 100 species of fish, 470 bird species, over 10 species 
of mammals and a range of reptiles and amphibians (GoSS 2007). The Sudd is 
the largest source of freshwater fish in South Sudan and breeds eight commer-
cially important species (e.g., Nile Perch, Nile Tilapia). Estimates indicate that 
the Sudd could provide 100,000 to 300,000 metric tons of fish annually on a sus-
tained basis. The majority of fish caught are smoke dried or sun dried, and then 
transported to markets throughout the region (USAID 2013). There are many 
other wetland systems throughout South Sudan, some of which are quite exten-
sive. Estimates show that wetlands comprise 7% of the total area of South Sudan 
(AfDB 2013).  
 
 
Figure 4 The Sudd 
 
Source:http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/a/a5/Sudd_location_map.svg/800px-
Sudd_location_map.svg.png 
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Whatever will happen upstream in the Nile Basin (in Uganda, Kenya, Rwanda 
and Burundi) will have an impact on the Nile waters (and the Sudd) in South Su-
dan. Whatever South Sudan will do with its vast water wealth will have an im-
pact on the use Egypt and Sudan will make of the Nile waters, although most of 
the Nile waters used by (northern) Sudan and Egypt depend on the water coming 
from the Blue Nile in Ethiopia. Some of the tributaries feeding the White Nile in 
South Sudan also come from Ethiopia (notably the Gambella region) and link 
these two countries as well. Geo-politically water will be one of the hot items of 
the whole region of the Nile Basin. 
Southern Sudan is thought to possess large areas of land underlain by rich aq-
uifers. These water-bearing formations are recharged by seasonal rainfall and 
river flooding and in some cases extend across international boundaries. The dis-
tribution and potential of groundwater and springs has not yet been fully deter-
mined and very little is known about the transboundary aquifers (GoSS 2007). In 
South Sudan, ground water is the principal source of drinking water, but very 
little work has been undertaken to determine the distribution and extraction levels 
of these resources (AfDB 2013). Salinity levels exceeding allowable limits have 
been observed in Jonglei and Unity states making ground water unsafe in some 
areas of these states. Other issues include the need to monitor ground water 
quality around oil exploration sites in Unity State and undertake assessments of 
the impact of the effluent from the waste stabilization and oxidation ponds 
around Juba. 
 
 
Figure 5 Precipitation zones  Figure 6 Temperature zones 
 
Source figures 5 and 6: UNEP 2007  
 
 
South Sudan’s varied climate, ranging from the northern desert to tropical rain 
forests in the south, produces an annual rainfall measuring from 400 millimetres 
in the semi-arid areas to over 1600 millimetres per year in the tropical rain forest 
(GoSS 2007). Temperatures in Juba vary around 27ºC all year round (maxima of 
34ºC and minima of some 19ºC during the night). Humidity is high (40-80%). 
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Figure 7  Temperatures in Juba 
 
Source:  http://www.weather-and-climate.com/average-monthly-Rainfall-Temperature-Sunshine,Juba, 
Sudan 
 
 
The most southern region of South Sudan belongs to the humid tropics; northeast 
of that humid zone the area is sub-humid and towards Sudan the area becomes 
semi-arid as is the area in the south east bordering Kenya. Despite the availability 
of abundant surface and ground water resources, millions of South Sudanese suf-
fer from lack of access to improved water supply and sanitation services. Two in 
three people lack access to improved water services and over eight out of ten 
people do not have access to improved sanitation services. This means that more 
than six million people would be deprived of access to improved water supply 
services and about eight million people lack access to improved sanitation ser-
vices (see more under section 2). Coupled with poor hygiene awareness, occur-
rence of water related diseases such as diarrhoea, cholera and guinea worm is 
high. The country is home to the largest incidence of guinea worm in the world. 
This is transmitted through drinking contaminated and stagnant water (AfDB 
2013). The importance of water also stems from the fact that households in South 
Sudan rely on a combination of (rain fed) agriculture, wild food gathering and 
hunting, fishing, livestock keeping and barter/exchange as the basis of their live-
lihoods. Access to food is seasonal and location-dependent. Seasonal movements 
to areas of supply are needed to increase resilience in the face of natural hazards, 
such as droughts and floods. It is only when insecurity keeps people or cattle 
from moving, that unusually acute hunger occurs. 
Demographic situation: population, urbanization,  
water consumption trends 
According to the UN Statistics Pocketbook 2014 South Sudan had an estimated 
10.8 million citizens in 2012. The average annual population growth will be 4% 
(2010-2015). The urban population in 2013 was 18.4%; the average annual urban 
population growth rate will be 4.2% (2010-2015), for the rural population this 
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growth rate will be 2.9%. The major urban area is Juba, with 269,000 citizens in 
2011. UN projections suggest that by 2025 the percentage of urban people in 
South Sudan will stand at some 25%. 
 
 
Figure 8 Population by age groups Figure 9  Distribution ethnic groups  
   South Sudan 
  
 
 
Source: CIA The World Factbook Source: Dr M Izady/www.Gulf2000.Columbia.edu 
 
 
The population of South Sudan is very young. Life expectancy at birth currently 
stands at 55 years. Many youngsters are uneducated in part because of the more 
than 20 years of civil war, as many children participated directly in the conflict as 
combatants. As a result the literacy rate of South Sudan is the lowest in the world 
(27%) (CIA World Factbook).  
South Sudan is comprised of three main ethnic groups, the Nilotic, Sudanese 
Nilotic, and Sudanese groups. The Nilotic group includes the Dinka, Nuer and 
Shiluk ethnic groups which depend mainly upon cattle husbandry, fishing and 
agriculture. The Sudanese Nilotic share with the Nilotic genetic and linguistic 
features and as well as modes of subsistence (cattle rearing) and include Bari, 
Mundari, and Toposa. Finally, the Sudanese group encompasses the Zandi, Madi, 
Bon and others living in the geographic belt between west of the Nile and near 
Sudan’s southern and south-western frontiers. Economic activity of these ethnic 
groups centres on agriculture rather than herding because of the spread of Tse-
Tse fly in their locations. South Sudan embraces different faiths, including Islam 
(6%), Christianity (61%) and indigenous African beliefs (33%) (Pew Research).  
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Figure 10  The ten states of South Sudan 
  
Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/South_Sudan 
 
 
South Sudan is subdivided in three regions, ten states and 86 counties. These 
counties are further split in Payams (districts) and Bomas (subdistricts). The Bahr 
el Ghazal region in northwest South Sudan includes the states of Northern Bahr 
el Ghazal, Western Bahr el Ghazal, Lakes and Warrap. The Equatoria region in 
southern South Sudan includes Western Equatoria, Central Equatoria and Eastern 
Equatoria. The Greater Upper Nile region includes the states of Jonglei, Unity 
and Upper Nile. The latter state has the lowest percentage of poor people while 
Northern Bahr el Ghazal is the poorest.  
 
 
Table 1 Population characteristics by State 2010 
State  Population  
(2010) 
Area (km²) Density 
(/km²) 
Poverty % Food 
Secure % 
Northern Bahr el 
Ghazal 
Western Bahr el 
Ghazal  
Lakes 
Warrap 
Western Equatoria 
Central Equatoria 
Eastern Equatoria 
Jonglei 
Unity 
Upper Nile 
820,834 
358,692 
782,504 
1,044,217 
658,863 
1,193,130 
962,719 
1,443,500 
645,465 
1,013,629 
30,543 
91,076 
43,595 
45,567 
79,343 
43,033 
73,472 
122,581 
37,837 
77,283 
26.87 
3.94 
17.95 
22.92 
8.30 
27.73 
13.10 
11.78 
17.06 
13.12 
75.0 
43.2 
48.9 
64.2 
42.1 
43.5 
49.8 
48.3 
68.4 
25.7 
57 
74 
59 
51 
79 
79 
51 
61 
79 
62 
Source: SSDP 2011; AfDB 2013 
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The vast majority of the population lives in rural areas with low population den-
sities. Even though the density varies widely, the average population density for 
South Sudan is estimated at 13 people per km2 compared to 166 in Uganda, 70 in 
Kenya, 83 in Ethiopia, and 36 people per km2 for Sub- Saharan Africa in 2009. 
The major urban areas besides Juba are Yei (south of Juba in Central Equatoria), 
Wau (Western Bahr el Ghazal) and Malakal (Upper Nile). Other urban centres 
that are also state capitals are Rumbek, Yambio, Torit, Bor, Aweil, Kuajok and 
Bentui. 
 
 
Figure 11 Population density  
 
Source: AfDB 2013 
 
Figure 12 Poverty levels  
 
Source: AfDB 2013 
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It should be realized though that South Sudan’s population growth and popula-
tion densities are influenced by major in and out migration. Newly erupted clash-
es from December 2013 onwards pushed many people out seeking refuge in 
neighbouring countries. In addition, many people became internally displaced 
when they sought safety in other parts of the country. A UNHCR 21-25 July 
2014 update states that there are currently almost 250,000 foreign refugees in 
South Sudan, and 1.5 million Sudanese people are displaced by the violence of 
which some 400,000 stay in neighbouring countries, notably Ethiopia and Ugan-
da (UNHCR 2014). 
 
 
Figure 13 Situation of IDPs as at May 2014 
 
Source: FEWS NET/OCHA 
 
 
The post-CPA period, though, saw the return of South Sudanese from Ethiopia, 
Kenya, Uganda, Egypt, and further afield. More than two million people returned 
from Sudan to South Sudan from 2005 to 2010 (McEthinney 2012). In general 
people continue to return to South Sudan, placing further pressure on food and 
water supplies. There are as many as 500,000 South Sudanese still expected to 
return from Sudan and both the government and agencies are extremely con-
cerned about the ability of South Sudan to provide for the growing number of 
arrivals (McEthinney 2012). Indeed the World Food Programme  reported in 
2013 that South Sudan had witnessed a significant increase in population to 
about 10 million in 2012 - largely due to the influx of returnees and refugees, 
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while the growth in cereal production has somewhat stagnated. The cereal deficit 
hit a record deficit of 475,000MT in 2012. In addition, lack of water in the areas 
where the returnees are being settled is also proving to be a major problem and 
given the limited resources available to the states it is becoming difficult for them 
to provide the water for the returnees. The state of infrastructure in most of the 
areas where these returnees would have been settled is also a major problem as it 
becomes difficult to transport the people, and they end up crowding the few ac-
cessible sites (SSDP 2011).  
The 2010 South Sudan Health and Household Survey estimated access levels 
to improved water sources in urban areas to be 67% (UNOCHA 2014). This fig-
ure is also used by the WHO/UNICEF Joint Monitoring Programme for Water 
Supply and Sanitation (2014). However, the stated level is widely disputed as 
almost all urban water systems are dysfunctional and the majority of the popula-
tion continues to rely on poor quality and often intermittent services. Estimates 
made by the $30 million Southern Sudan Water and Sanitation Programme fund-
ed through the Multi Donor Trust Fund (MDTF) suggest that in 2009, access lev-
els in urban areas were limited to only 14% (World Bank 2013). This is in line 
with the AfDB study which indicates that access levels in Juba, Wau and Mala-
kal varied from 13% to 20% in 2010. Nationwide the AfDB report estimates that 
15% of the urban population had access to improved water supply services. Part 
of this confusion about access to improved water sources is caused by a lack of 
first hand data as concluded by Lidonde (2009).  
Donors supported the construction of treatment plants, booster stations and 
truck refilling stations in Wau and Juba. This translates into an average availabil-
ity of water of 15 litres/capita/day, alarmingly low compared to a minimum aver-
age of 50 litres/capita/ day set for most urban towns in Africa. Moreover, less 
than 10% of investment costs were allocated to improving the distribution sys-
tems, partly comprised of health-risky old asbestos cement pipes. This aged dis-
tribution network also causes major leakage and losses, estimated to reach 50%. 
Further to this, the influx of IDPs to Juba meant that the system could not cope 
with the increase in demand. The lack of adequate system capacity led to a surge 
in the development of private wells. About 400 of them supply water to an esti-
mated 56% of the population in Juba, considerably higher than the average for 
African urban dwellers at 33%. In addition, water is supplied either by tankers or 
by young men pushing bicycles through the streets transporting plastic water 
containers. Lack of clean water and sanitation, as well as poor hygiene practices, 
increase the risk of waterborne diseases that lead to illness and death, particularly 
among young children (GWI 2011). Today, Japan International Cooperation 
Agency (JICA) is supporting capacity building activities for the town’s water 
supply station and is also planning to carry out design and construction works for 
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a new system with the intention of commissioning it after 2015 (AfDB 2013). 
The WHO/UNICEF 2014 update gives a total of 55% of the rural population 
having access to improved drinking water sources (protected sources). Other lit-
erature sources, however, stress that this clean water is mostly from boreholes 
provided by NGOs as emergency during the war. Many of these wells are facing 
problems nowadays and 30-50% are non-operational at any time. It is not un-
common for rural women and children to spend most of their day collecting wa-
ter (USAID 2012; AfDB 2013). As a result the availability of improved water 
sources for the rural population is approximately 34% (SSDP 2011). 
Levels of sanitation are even worse than those of access to improved water. 
Some of the reasons for this are (i) low priority on the development agenda (ii) 
burden of carrying costs on households (iii) absence of a single lead ministry and 
(iv) resistance to behavioural changes. For example, digging latrines is seen as a 
degrading job and by some as “inviting death”. Others claim that using a latrine 
might make a person infertile. More studies are needed to understand behavioural 
change. Apart from a few NGOs and development partners implementing sanita-
tion projects, there is no dedicated budget towards improving sanitation and hy-
giene services (AfDB 2013). Table 2 shows the types of sanitation facilities used 
in the country. 
 
 
Table 2 Access to sanitation (2010)  
Facility Access % Pop with access (millions) 
 urban rural total urban rural total 
Flush toilet 
VIP latrines 
Pit latrines with slab 
Composting toilet 
Unimproved/open 
defecation 
Total 
9.3 
8.1 
20.5 
0.7 
61.4 
100 
2.9 
1.2 
5 
0.2 
90.7 
100 
4 
2.3 
7.6 
0.3 
85.8 
100 
0.16 
0.14 
0.36 
0.01 
1.07 
1.74 
0.22 
0.93 
0.39 
0.02 
6.2 
7.76 
0.38 
1.07 
0.75 
0.03 
7.27 
9.5 
Source: AfDB citing South Sudan Health and Household Survey 2010 
 
 
According to the South Sudan Development Plan 2011- 2013 dignified housing, 
water and sanitation services for the people of South Sudan will enable people to 
live good lives where their unleashed physical and psychological potential will 
stimulate economic growth and sustainable development. Therefore, the rights to 
housing (habitat), safe water and improved sanitation are not only fundamental 
human rights but also locomotives for development. Unlike provision of housing, 
water and sanitation services are to a larger extent considered public goods that 
the Government has to provide. Nevertheless, the Government will need to create 
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an enabling environment for financing, cost recovery and private sector involve-
ment in order to sustain these services (SSDP 2011). 
Political situation and institutional setting 
Political situation 
South Sudan gained independence from Sudan in July 2011 as the outcome of the 
2005 peace deal. The state plunged into a major crisis again in December 2013 
amid a power struggle between President Salva Kiir and his deputy Riek Machar 
whom he had sacked. Fighting between SPLM government troops and rebel fac-
tions erupted, and within weeks the conflict had killed thousands and prompted 
more than 800,000 to flee their homes. The conflict has also grown into an ethnic 
conflict, with fighting e.g. between the Dinka and the Nuer, and into a conflict 
about control over the oil fields. The majority of the oil reserves are located in 
South Sudan, however, the pipelines, refining and export infrastructure are locat-
ed in the north, making South Sudan dependent on Sudan. A dispute over reve-
nue sharing in 2012 made South Sudan decide to cut the flow of oil through the 
pipelines via Sudan to the Red Sea, which hurt both countries economically. This 
decision was reversed in March 2013; however, oil production remained lower 
than before the cut and South Sudan kept looking for other export routes to over-
come dependence on Sudan in the future (Africa Yearbook, 2014; BBC South 
Sudan Profile). 
Several border disputes with Sudan continue to strain ties. The main row is 
over the border region of Abyei, where a referendum for the residents to decide 
whether to join south or north has been delayed. The conflict is rooted in a dis-
pute over land between farmers of the pro-South Sudan Dinka Ngok people and 
cattle-herding Misseriya Arab tribesmen. Another border conflict zone is the Nu-
ba Mountains region of Sudan’s South Kordofan state, where violence continues 
between the largely Christian and pro-SPLA Nuba people and northern govern-
ment forces. Inside South Sudan, a cattle-raiding feud between rival ethnic 
groups in Jonglei state has left hundreds of people dead and some 100,000 dis-
placed since independence. Several rebel forces opposed to the SPLM-dominated 
government have emerged, including the South Sudan Liberation Army (SSLA) 
of Peter Gadet and a force originally formed by a former SPLA general, the late 
George Athor. Juba says these forces are funded by Sudan, which denies the ac-
cusation (BBC South Sudan Profile).  
Some observers see a paradox in that South Sudan’s aim to decentralize gov-
ernance through building strong local institutions is counterproductive because 
these new institutions lack accountability. The goal of breaking power down into 
small administrative units while simultaneously seeking to portray and build a 
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strong central state combines two approaches at odds with one another, pulling 
Southern Sudan into opposite directions. Decentralisation, while theoretically the 
best way to govern Southern Sudan, has in reality often become an instrument to 
entrench ‘tribal’ lines over competition for resources (Schomerus et al. 2010).  
For many Southern Sudanese, living in peace seems to come with two major 
expectations: personal security and access to resources. Witnessing development 
and better life through services is vital. The absence of tangible development in 
many areas has made the notion of peace insignificant and encouraged violent 
behaviour. Building of hospitals and gaining access to education are seen as vital 
in establishing peace, and this realisation needs to be at the heart of peace-
building activities (Schomerus et al. 2010).  
By defining conflicts as local and tribal, peace conferences have neglected the 
broader political context. Instead, a long-term local peace-building strategy is 
needed. This calls for a long term commitment that seems to be lacking at the 
moment. Moreover, the country needs fundamental reworking of the governance 
agreement between and within elites and communities if a negotiated settlement 
is to lead to a sustainable peace, claims the International Crisis Group (ICG 
2014). 
Although quite substantial funds have been allocated by donors to Southern 
Sudan, much of it has not yet been spent or has been used for recurrent expendi-
ture rather than investment. The political turmoil the country is facing is partly 
responsible for this. There are also many accusations about misuse of aid money 
and other government income by the SPLM/SPLA leaders. South Sudan’s rank 
on the 2014 Transparency International list of corrupt states is 174 out of 177 
states.  
 
Institutional setting of water  
The lead ministry in the water sector is the Ministry of Electricity, Dams, Irriga-
tion and Water Resources (MEDIWR). The Ministry is mandated to (i) develop 
policies, guidelines and master plans;  (ii) oversee the operation of the South Su-
dan Urban Water Corporation; (iii) set tariffs for the sale of water; (iv) imple-
ment ground-water supplies of drinking water for the rural population until States 
and local governments assume such responsibilities; and (v) advise, support and 
build the capacity of State and Local governments in charge of water services. A 
Provisional Order (PO) passed in 2008 created the Southern Sudan Urban Water 
Corporation (SSUWC) as a semi-autonomous institution and made it responsible 
for operating urban water facilities. The provision of schemes for sewage dispos-
al and treatment in urban areas is entrusted to the Ministry of Lands, Housing and 
Physical Planning. 
16 
The principal document guiding the country’s water and sanitation sector is 
the Water Policy document. Adopted in 2007, the policy recognizes that access 
to improved water supply and sanitation services positively impacts the reduction 
of poverty and boosts economic growth. It underpins that provision of sufficient 
quantity and quality of water is considered a human right and shall be accorded 
highest priority. The policy highlights that investments in rural water supply and 
sanitation shall be targeted to those areas which are currently not served and/or 
experience acute water shortages. Experiences in this sector by a Dutch NGO 
about the lack of capacity and (too) ambitious plans at State level are presented 
in Bennet (2008).  
In 2011, the Government adopted the water, sanitation and hygiene strategic 
framework. The strategy has been crafted to translate the water policy into action 
and aims at serving as a road map towards attaining the objectives of the policy. 
A key element of the framework dwells on speeding up rehabilitation and con-
struction of water supply and sanitation schemes to ensure universal access of 
services to the people of South Sudan. It recognizes the low level of access to 
improved sanitation and hygiene services and proposes a reversal of the situation 
through techniques such as Community Led Total Sanitation (CLTS), a method-
ology for mobilising communities to completely eliminate open defecation 
(AfDB 2013). 
At state, county and payam level, structures are also put in place to improve 
the water and sanitation situation. Foremost the State Ministry of Physical Infra-
structure is responsible, but at the local level, lack of cooperation in planning is a 
problem. Water projects tend to be donor driven rather than based on needs as-
sessments. This has dotted the countryside with ‘monuments’. Knowledge about 
the number and locations of water sources such as boreholes is lacking 
(Schomerus et al. 2010).  
There are also a number of Private Service Providers (PSPs) that are active in 
transportation of water and sewage services in the urban areas. In the absence of 
a Water Act, responsibilities of service delivery as well as regulatory functions 
are characterized by gaps and overlaps (AfDB 2013). The proposed programme 
for sustainable water and sanitation services calls for capital outlays of about $ 2 
billion. Given the large number of competing sectors such as education, health 
and other infrastructure services, there is a risk of securing insufficient public 
funds for water and sanitation.  
Shortly after independence, South Sudan became the newest member state of 
the Nile Basin Initiative (NBI), an inter-governmental organization dedicated to 
equitable and sustainable management and development of the shared water re-
sources of the Nile Basin (see box 1). 
 
 
17 
BOX 1: Nile Basin Initiative (NBI) 
 
In the last century several treaties were put in place by Nile riparian countries. The 1929 
Agreement between Egypt and Anglo-Egyptian Sudan gave Egypt complete control over the 
Nile, put substantial limits on the amount of water allocated to Sudan, and provided no water 
rights to any of the other riparian states. The 1959 Nile Agreement between Sudan and Egypt 
allowed the entire average annual flow of the Nile to be shared between Egypt and Sudan at 
55.5 and 18.5 billion m3, respectively. The Agreement granted Egypt the right to construct the 
Aswan High Dam and Sudan the right to construct the Rosaries Dam on the Blue Nile and to 
develop irrigation and hydroelectric power generation. Upstream countries Burundi, DRC, 
Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania and Uganda were denied formal rights to the Nile water. 
Negotiations for creation of a Cooperative Framework Agreement started in 1997. In February 
1999, the Nile Basin Initiative (NBI), which is a partnership among the Nile riparian states, was 
formally launched by the then nine countries that shared the resources of the river. With support 
from donors, the NBI aims at building capacities among member states, making investments in 
water resource development and management. Pressures are growing. The basin is home to 
more than 160 million people currently. As a result, seven upper riparian states launched the 
Nile Basin Cooperative Framework Agreement in a bid to establish a permanent organizational 
structure and ensure an equitable utilization among all the riparian states of the Nile. So far six 
riparian states have signed the Agreement (DRC, Sudan and Egypt have not yet signed the 
agreement). The lack of agreement among all the riparian states indicates that the utilization of 
Nile waters will continue to pose a challenge at least for the foreseeable future (source: Colins 
2001; AfDB 2013; Howell et al 2008; Kibrome 2011).  
Economic setting: Economic growth,  
transport system, innovation, ICT 
Despite its abundant natural resources (hydropower, fertile agricultural land, 
gold, diamonds, petroleum, hardwoods, limestone, iron ore, copper, chromium 
ore, zinc, tungsten, mica, silver), South Sudan is a relatively undeveloped, sub-
sistence economy. The South Sudan government relies heavily on oil export rev-
enues. Oil accounts for 98% of the government’s revenues and contributes 60-
80% to GDP. Oil was discovered in Sudan in the 1980s by Chevron; the first oil 
was produced and exported in 1999 following the completion of the pipeline 
from central Sudan to the Red Sea port of Bashair. Today foreign companies in-
volved in Sudan’s oil sector are primarily from Asia (China National Petroleum 
Company, Oil and Natural Gas Corporation (ONGC) of India, and PETRONAS 
from Malaysia (see also ICG 2012; Large & Patey 2011). The oil sector does not 
provide many jobs. Of South Sudan’s work force, 85% are active in agriculture 
(including animal husbandry, forest use and fisheries) which accounts for only 
around 15% of GDP (World Bank South Sudan Overview).   
During the past three years, the GDP of South Sudan has fluctuated because of 
changes in oil prices, and so has the value added by the petroleum sector. For the 
period as a whole, GDP has averaged about $12.7 billion at current prices. Gross 
national income per capita has fluctuated, but has averaged about $1,050 during 
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this period. South Sudan is therefore at the low end of the Lower Middle Income 
Country category as defined by the World Bank (AfDB 2013). However, most of 
its people can be regarded as belonging to the poorest on Earth. 
In its South Sudan Development Plan of 2011-2013, the government states 
that given the country’s abundant fertile land, water resources, its youthful labour 
situation but highly constrained skills, productivity and investment levels, the 
greatest potential for initial new growth is likely to be from the small-scale pri-
vate, predominantly family-owned, agriculture and livestock sectors (SSDP 
2011).  
 
 
Figure 14  Sudan and South Sudan oil exports by destination (2010)  
 
 
Source: World Energy Atlas, ECOS, APEC Source: African Energy 2012 
 
 
Furthermore, the strategy envisages a South Sudan that would exploit opportuni-
ties to process food products and raw materials for value addition, job creation 
and increased earnings. South Sudan will need to speed up the execution of the 
development plan because oil production peaked in 2009 and is projected to de-
cline sharply over the next 10 years and is expected to cease in 2035 unless new 
oil fields are discovered. Moreover, as the oil pipelines, refining and export infra-
structure are located in the north, South Sudan is – for the time being – heavily 
dependent on Sudan. In order to become less dependent, it is investigating other 
export routes, mainly the southern route to Lamu (Kenya) on the Indian Ocean. 
In April 2013, a deal was made with Japanese company Toyota to support the 
building of a proposed pipeline to Lamu (SSDP, 2011; Africa Yearbook, 2014).  
The South Sudan Development Plan 2011-2013 has the following priorities for 
economic development: 1. Increase agricultural production; 2. Increase livestock 
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production; 3. Improve and expand the road infrastructure of the country; 4. Ex-
pand and improve the water and sanitation infrastructure of the country, and 5. 
Ensure good management of oil sector resources. The SSDP acknowledged that a 
key priority would be to create a situation where peace would prevail. Invest-
ments (from oil and foreign assistance) will be needed to fight poverty and create 
employment for a labour force that is growing at 250,000 per annum (AfDB 
2013). A major influx of foreigners after the war, looking for economic oppor-
tunity, an asset in terms of the skills they have brought, are also quickly coming 
to be perceived as crowding less educated Southern Sudanese out of the labour 
market in their own country (Maxwell et al. 2012). Still, aggressive promotion 
and facilitation of domestic and foreign investors is planned to drive growth. The 
Ministry of Investment aims to improve the business environment. Doing Busi-
ness Juba 2011 ranked the country 159 out of 183 (DB 2011). Starting a business 
is relatively easy, but subsequent steps (protection, credit, closure) are less well 
arranged. Very problematic cross border transport (rank 181) is a typical charac-
teristic that shows the difficulties of doing business in South Sudan. 
The transport system in South Sudan consists of four modes – road, rail, river 
and air transport – the largest being road transport. South Sudan’s main access to 
the sea is through Mombasa in Kenya  (which accounts for most of the traffic), 
Port Sudan and Djibouti ports. The country lacks roads linking major towns, 
feeder road networks between rural communities, and proper maintenance for all 
roads. Until recently South Sudan’s road network of some 12,500 km had only 
100 kilometres paved outside Juba (IMF 2011). South Sudan’s road infrastruc-
ture was largely destroyed or left in disrepair during the protracted civil wars. A 
192 km paved road between Juba and Nimule on the Ugandan border was con-
structed with USAID funds in 2012. In July 2014 it was announced that road 
maintenance and rehabilitation work would be funded by the Government of the 
Netherlands, and implemented by the UN World Food Programme Feeder Roads 
Special Operations.  
The density of paved roads in South Sudan is 0.2 km per 1,000 km2, which is 
much lower than the averages of 16.9 km per 1,000 km2 for Sub-Saharan Africa 
(AfDB 2013). This has: i) contributed to the slow economic growth and devel-
opment of rural and peri-urban communities; ii) prevented people from connect-
ing to markets; iii) imposed high transportation costs on traders and farmers that 
choose to carry products to markets; and iv) inhibited people’s ability to access 
basic social services like health and education (USAID). South Sudan has a rail-
way system of 248 km. The railroad between Babonosa (Sudan) and Wau was 
repaired in 2010 with $250 million of United Nations funds (CIA World 
Factbook). In 2013 the Chinese government announced a $5.2 bn investment in a 
rail network for East Africa linking South Sudan, Uganda and Rwanda to the 
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Kenyan coast. The bulk of the road freight has been imports through the port of 
Mombasa (Kenya). There are also plans for a new road link to Ethiopia to carry 
oil by truck (Africa Yearbook, 2014; see ICG 2012 for a map of the planned road 
network in South Sudan). 
The section of the White Nile between Juba and the border with Sudan is nav-
igable and it is about 1,300 km long. A number of tributaries are also navigable 
for certain stretches and periods of the year. The navigable part of White Nile 
and its tributaries crosses six of the ten states of South Sudan. The poor road in-
frastructure, presence of land mines in some areas and vast swampy areas make 
river transport a practical and cost-effective option to reach communities along 
the White Nile and its tributaries (AfDB 2013). Rehabilitation of water courses 
(dredging) and construction of suitable ports and beaches will form an important 
component of future transport strategy to facilitate navigation of waterways in 
Southern Sudan (GoSS 2007). Japanese support for the Juba River Port Expan-
sion Project will transform the port into a modern well-equipped facility.  
As far as communication is concerned, a media survey from September 2013 
commissioned by US based NGO Internews found that radio remains the most 
accessible source of information for the vast majority of people in South Sudan, 
though males and younger generations have greater access to radio as well as to 
other technology-based sources of information. According to Internews South 
Sudan is in the early stages of building capacity for its media infrastructure. Few 
households own televisions or computers, and internet access is extremely lim-
ited. 
 
 
Figure 15 Status of Access to ICT by household by State in South Sudan (2008) 
 
Source: AfDB 2013 
 
 
The 2011-2013 Development Plan envisions a key role for the ICT sector in the 
economic growth of the country. Mobile phone coverage should expand from 
21 
around 60 to 100% of the population between 2010 and 2020. Economic benefits 
accruing from the use of mobile phones and other ICTs especially for farm-
ers/pastoralists include improved agricultural advisory services, market and 
product information.  
Agricultural dynamics 
According to the South Sudan Country Profile of ‘FAO in Emergencies’, up to 
95 percent of the country’s population depends on farming, fishing or herding to 
meet their food and income needs. Sorghum is the main cereal, followed by mil-
let and maize. Agricultural performance varies considerably from place to place 
and from year to year, ranging from the possibility of two harvests per annum in 
Greater Equatoria (notably Greenbelt area) to one harvest in the unimodal areas 
further north (e.g. Eastern Flood Plains). An estimated 75% of the country’s land 
area is suitable for agriculture while approximately 330,000 km2, or about half of 
the total land space, is potentially suitable for crop cultivation. However, in spite 
of having 50% of its arable land mass as prime agricultural land, only 4% of this 
area is cultivated continuously or periodically (AfDB 2013). The remaining is 
either grassland (23%) or covered with trees and shrubs (72%). 
According to FAO-WFP reports, only about 10,000 km2 were put under culti-
vation in 2008. The Western Flood Plains livelihood zone has the most cropland 
(34% of national cropland). Greenbelt and Eastern Flood Plains zones are the 
other two important crop production regions, accounting for, respectively, 18% 
and 26% of national cropland. Almost all irrigated crops (mainly rice) are in Up-
per Nile; rice on flood land is all in Northern Bahr el Ghazal while fruit trees and 
tree plantations are exclusively in the Green Belt Zone encompassing Western, 
Central, and Eastern Equatoria which have the longest Length of Growing Period 
(LGP) in South Sudan.  
With assistance from USAID and the World Bank, the Government has for-
mulated strategies for expansion of the cultivated areas in various parts of the 
country (AfDB 2013). Most cultivation is accounted for by smallholder subsist-
ence farmers (0.5-1.5 ha) that, in the absence of fertilizers, pesticides and herbi-
cides, practice some form of shifting cultivation. As a result South Sudan’s aver-
age yield is low relative to most other countries in the region, averaging only 
0.97 tonnes per hectare during 2005-2009; it is far below the average of 7.64 tons 
per hectare in Egypt where the bulk of the cereals are grown under irrigation. 
These low cereal yields in South Sudan stem from a range of problems faced by 
smallholder farmers.   
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Figure 16  Constraints for crop production in South Sudan 
 
Source: AfDB 2013 
 
 
A survey undertaken in 2006 by Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, with sup-
port from FAO and the WFP, asked farmers what were their primary constraints 
to improving crop production (see AfDB 2013). Pests and crop diseases, shortage 
of seeds and erratic rainfall were the three most important concerns. Southern 
Sudan has an abundance of livestock whose population is estimated at 10 million 
heads of cattle with an annual growth rate of 2-3%. The livestock sector contrib-
utes over 15% of GDP and employs, directly or indirectly, 70% of the popula-
tion. As such the sector is of central importance in efforts to promote food securi-
ty, poverty alleviation and enhanced economic growth. Livestock is generally 
concentrated in areas where rainfall is marginal for cultivation and the distribu-
tion of livestock watering points is a major determinant of grazing patterns. Sea-
sonal migrations in search of water and pasture frequently result in land and wa-
ter use conflicts between different pastoral and agro-pastoral groups. The current 
uneven distribution of water points often leads to the concentration of large num-
bers of livestock, especially during the dry season, with negative impacts on wa-
ter resources and the surrounding environment. Key livestock zones are Arid 
Zone, Hills and Mountains Zone and Eastern Flood Plains. See below details of 
South Sudan’s livelihood regions summarised from Muchomba & Sharp (no pub-
lication year stated, see reference list). 
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Figure 17 Constraints for livestock production in South Sudan 
 
Source: AfDB 2013 
 
Figure 18  Rural Livelihood Zones of southern Sudan 
 
Source: Muchomba, E. & B. Sharp (no date) 
 
Figure 19 Seasonality of Rainfall in Livelihood Zones of southern Sudan 
 
Source: Muchomba, E. & B. Sharp (no date)   
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South Sudan’s livelihood regions: 
Greenbelt Zone: 
The Greenbelt is the most fertile traditional cereal growing zone of southern Sudan. It has very 
reliable rainfall, with average annual precipitation of 1,350-1,600 mm. Most of the vegetation is 
luxuriant broadleaf woodlands, which decrease towards the north of the zone. The main 
economic activity is farming, with a wide variety of crops including sorghum, maize, millet, 
cassava, groundnuts, rice, sweet potatoes, fruit, sesame, tobacco, sugarcane, soya beans, 
vegetables and coffee. Households in the wetter south-western areas of the Greenbelt Zone rely 
almost exclusively on agriculture to meet their food needs. Here, surplus production is common. 
This is the traditional surplus-producing agricultural region, also known as the ‘breadbasket’ of 
southern Sudan. Unlike other zones, rainfall is usually not a limitation. Immense exchange 
opportunities exist with the neighbouring crop-deficit zones and as far as Uganda, but 
movement of this surplus is highly constrained by the extremely poor road network, which has 
discouraged farmers from producing as much as they potentially could.  
 
Arid Zone: 
In the Arid Zone, which occupies the south-eastern tip of the country, households practice a 
nearly pure form of pastoralism and there is almost exclusive reliance on livestock and livestock 
trade for food. This is the driest of all the zones, and here drought is the norm. The zone is 
typically dry Sahelian savannah, with an average annual rainfall of less than 200 mm. The soils 
of the large plains are predominantly sandy loam. There are few permanent rivers or water 
points. During the dry season (October to May), the cattle are taken to hills where there is grass 
and water. Along the Ethiopian border, there is a range of high country that offers good grazing 
and numerous water points. The zone is predominantly inhabited by two main ethnic groups 
(Toposa and Murle). Some households attempt to grow sorghum, but more often than not it 
fails, making the exchange of livestock for grain and access to water and pasture in 
neighbouring areas (including Kenya) a necessity. However, cattle raiding and poor relations 
with neighbouring communities often disrupt this critical access. Conflict mitigation and peace-
building initiatives to address cattle raiding practices will need to be prioritised with the 
involvement of all local and neighbouring communities, including the Turkana of Kenya and 
Karamoja of Uganda. 
 
Hills and Mountains Zone: 
The Hills and Mountains Zone falls somewhere between these two extremes (agriculture and 
pastoralism), with reliance on cattle, trade and root crops increased in difficult years. A 
significant amount of cassava is grown and ensures that most households are food secure even 
during drought years. Drought (in the mountains) and floods (in the lowlands or plains) are not 
uncommon in this zone. Still, two distinct rainy seasons and the relationships between highland 
and lowland (plains) systems gives this Zone some unique characteristics that have helped to 
sustain its food security through times of conflict. Many different ethnic groups inhabit the 
zone, namely: Moru in Juba, Lotuka in Torit, Acholi in Magwi, Buya and Didinga in Budi, and 
Murle, Jie and Kachipo in the hilly parts of Pibor. Households in this zone are mostly agro-
pastoral. Apart from land, cattle are the main asset in this zone. However, traditionally, there has 
been insecurity caused by cattle raiding among the many different ethnic groups. The 
improvement of the security situation remains the pivotal priority for local recovery, as well as 
inter-ethnic peace building initiatives to address the cattle raiding situation. Accelerating the 
removal of landmines and the improvement of the road infrastructure would promote access to 
and the expansion of existing markets such as Juba, Torit, Kapoeta and Lafon, and possibly 
support the emergence of new markets. 
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Western Flood Plains Zone: 
In the Western Flood Plains Zone, livestock and agriculture, supplemented by fish and wild 
foods, are the main food sources. The zone is occupied by predominantly agro-pastoralist Dinka 
groups. Flooding of local rivers (the Nile’s tributaries) usually occurs between July and 
September. Water levels in the zone’s major river systems (Lol and Jur) depend on rainfall in 
their catchments that extend as far as the Central African Republic (CAR) border, as well as on 
local rainfall, which feeds swamps and tributaries along the course of the rivers. Flooding is a 
normal and important feature of these river systems, supporting fish and water lily production. 
The Western Flood Plains Zone has been at the centre of the war with its close proximity to the 
northern areas, the presence of the railway line, and strategic political positioning. Opportunities 
for increasing food security start with promoting cash income opportunities, strengthening 
market infrastructure, and improving road conditions and links with northern Sudan and the 
crop-surplus Greenbelt. 
 
Eastern Flood Plains Zone: 
The Eastern Flood Plains Zone is quite similar to the Western Flood Plains, differing primarily 
in that households cultivate less and move longer distances for grazing, water, fishing and 
exchange. The Eastern Flood Plains Zone is characterised by flat, low-lying terrain with black 
cotton soils. Savannah grasslands and acacia trees are the typical vegetative cover. Annual 
rainfall tends to occur between June and September, and ranges from 700 to 1,300 mm. 
Flooding of the Sobat River and its tributaries normally results from either local rains within the 
zone, and/or heavy rainfall in the Ethiopian highlands. Thus it is possible for flooding to occur 
even in a year when there is no heavy local rainfall. The steep banks of the Sobat tend to limit 
overflow, thus constraining the areas where wet season grazing is found. Crop performance 
tends to be unreliable due to poor agricultural practices, the difficulty of cultivating the heavy 
black cotton soils, and unpredictable weather patterns. Human productivity is seriously 
undermined on a periodic basis by dry season water shortages, which are a predominant and 
chronic feature of this zone. As water becomes scarce, people have to move increasingly long 
distances, and residents have been known to walk up to five days to find water. In addition to 
extended migration patterns, water shortages also give rise to a high incidence of waterborne 
illnesses and malnutrition during the dry season. Insecurity worsens the health and water 
situations for those who do not migrate: during conflict, more members of the family stay at the 
homestead, increasing pressure on local water sources. The zone is occupied by four ethnic 
groups: the Nuer, Dinka, Anyuak and Shilluk. These ethnic groups - and the clans within them - 
have a long history of conflict over pasture, water and cattle. These long-standing conflicts have 
periodically resulted in serious food insecurity. Challenges include lack of cohesive local 
political leadership, and poor infrastructure for facilitating access to food and non-food needs. 
This includes poor access to local and cross-border trade with Ethiopia. 
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Ironstone Plateau Zone: 
The Ironstone Plateau Zone is mostly agricultural and has a strong potential for increased trade 
and exchange with the three neighbouring zones of Western Flood Plains, Hills and Mountains, 
and the Greenbelt. It is also a potential source of much needed labour, particularly for the 
Greenbelt Zone. The sparsely populated Ironstone Plateau contains a range of ethnic groups, 
predominantly a Nilotic group of Luo, with other groupsincluding Dinka, Fertit, Azande, and 
many others. Households in the Ironstone Plateau Zone are heavily dependent on crop 
production and are well placed to access surpluses in the neighbouring Greenbelt. Rainfall 
averages between 950-1300 mm annually in the zone. The lateritic soils do not hold water well 
and become shallower towards the north of the zone, contributing to some of the most acute 
water problems in southern Sudan. Agro-climatic conditions favour sorghum, which is the main 
crop, besides some maize growing. Drought-resistant cassava and wild yams are widely used to 
compensate for grain shortfalls following a poor harvest. Drought often affects local crop yields. 
Improving access to water will also be critical as it will reduce the pressures on scarce labour, 
freeing up time from collecting water for more productive activities. 
 
Nile and Sobat Rivers Zone: 
The Nile, Sobat and Pibor rivers and the vast oilfields are the most significant natural resources 
in this zone, providing one of the highest levels of water and pasture availability in southern 
Sudan. Open water sources are often shared with livestock, and water is also collected from 
local pools during the rains. Dry season pastures are predominantly found along the rivers and 
swamps and are often shared by different community groups. This overlapping need for grazing 
areas has traditionally been the source of regular conflicts. The zone receives between 700-
1,300 mm of rainfall annually. The area is prone to seasonal annual flooding (July-December) 
from the Nile and Sobat rivers, which increases yields of fish and wild plants. This zone is 
distinct from the Eastern and Western Flood Plains zones in that local livelihoods are far more 
dependent on the rivers, which harbour the most productive fishing and water lily harvesting 
areas in southern Sudan. In addition crops and livestock contribute significantly in the Nile and 
Sobat Rivers Zone. Tobacco sales also provide an important contribution to household incomes. 
Other economic opportunities include flood recessional agriculture (i.e. following annual 
flooding) and the potential for horticulture for domestic and export agricultural markets. Where 
recessional agriculture is not possible, irrigation may be a viable alternative. This livelihood 
zone is predominantly inhabited by the Dinka, Nuer and Shilluk ethnic groups. Current 
challenges include: limited access to major markets; underutilisation of Nile River Basin 
transport; and untapped water-dependent production potential. Concurrent improvements would 
have to be made to road and market infrastructure, and environmental protection would need to 
be made a priority. Source: Muchomba & Sharp (no date) 
 
An important unresolved practical issue is the pace at which land can be devel-
oped. The answer depends on the extent to which the Government, with assis-
tance from the donor community and private investors, addresses the existing 
constraints to agricultural expansion in South Sudan. The aim is to increase the 
total cultivated area from 2.7 million ha in 2010 to 4 million ha by 2020 and per-
haps 6-7 million hectares by 2030 (AfDB 2013). Moreover, the strategy is not yet 
clear if this expansion should be based on small-scale and/or large-scale farms 
involvement. Southern Sudan did have large- scale farms (rice, sugarcane) in the 
past but these were destroyed during the war (UNEP 2007). Several scenarios are 
possible, yet a mix of both scales of operation is most likely: first, a larger share 
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of the existing 2.7m ha of land that is cultivated periodically by smallholder 
farmers would be brought under continuous cultivation with improved access to 
markets, lower transport costs and access to inputs such as fertilizer and herbi-
cides, use of out-grower models, and so on (see e.g. IRIN 17/02/2011). Second, a 
substantial investment would also be made in cultivation of new land by medi-
um- and large-scale commercial farming operations, many of which would oper-
ate with out-grower models that would allow nearby existing or new smallholder 
farms to supply fresh foods and agricultural raw materials for processing by the 
commercial operation. Opponents of the latter strategy fear that opportunistic 
investors will ‘grab land’ at the expense of the local communities. The Norwe-
gian People’s Aid organization, the largest international NGO active in South 
Sudan, raised a warning that several opportunistic deals were planned and un-
derway. In just four years, between the start of 2007 and the end of 2010, foreign 
(mostly western and middle east) interests sought or acquired a total of 2.64 mil-
lion hectares of land (26,400 km2) in the agriculture, forestry and biofuel sectors 
alone (Deng 2011a). It drafted a number of recommendations to address the risks 
and opportunities of large scale land investments; linking with local communi-
ties, transparency in contracts, a temporary moratorium etc. Other organizations 
such as the Oakland Institute, have characterized the land deals in South Sudan 
as unfair to local communities and urged the government to support smallholder 
farming as the best way forward (see e.g. Deng 2011b). UNEP (2007) does not 
oppose large-scale farming but warns for potential environmental problems (pes-
ticides, water pollution, canal siltation, soil salinization) and yield reduction es-
pecially if irrigation schemes are started in the wrong location.  
 
 
Figure 20 Locations for potential commercial investment in South Sudan 
 
Source: AfDB 2013 
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Expanding cultivated areas will come at considerable financial costs. The mobili-
zation of these levels of investment for agriculture represents another major chal-
lenge for the decade ahead. Several large-scale investors seem not to have moved 
to a production stage.  
Another sensitive issue will be that promoting irrigated agriculture might af-
fect the downstream Nile basin countries of Sudan and Egypt. The 2007 South 
Sudan water policy claims that given adequate water supply, most tropical crops 
can be grown and realize its label of potential ‘bread basket’ for the region as the 
country did 25 years ago. A range of irrigation techniques (traditional and mod-
ern) can be observed in different parts of Southern Sudan. Areas have been ear-
marked for the expansion of irrigated agriculture, whether small or large scale.  
 
 
Figure 21 Location of prospective areas for development of irrigation schemes 
  
Source: AfDB 2013 
 
 
Part of the planned irrigated scheme area is in the Jonglei State. In the later 1970s 
this area saw the start of the construction of the 360 km long Jonglei canal link-
ing Bor with Malakal (Mohamed 2005; UNEP 2007; Howell et al. 2009; Lam-
berts 2009). The idea, already launched in 1907, was to bypass the Sudd wet-
lands of South Sudan so as to deliver some 5 to 7% more water (appr 4.8 
Gm3/year) downstream to (North) Sudan and Egypt for use in agriculture. The 
reasoning was that too much water was lost in the Sudd due to evapotranspira-
tion. Warnings that major environmental and economic negative impacts were to 
be expected on the livelihoods of local communities in the South, in particular 
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the pastoralist groups such as the Nuer, Dinka and Shilluk, were ignored by the 
authorities in Khartoum. The canal was never completed because when 240 km 
out of a total of 360 km of the canal had been excavated, the infrastructure was 
bombed by the SPLA in 1984. Its construction was never resumed (Salman 2008; 
Cascão 2013).  
 
 
Figure 22 The Jonglei canal 
   
Source: www.chappart.co.uk/pdfs/Sudan.pdf 
Energy dynamics 
Energy consumption in South Sudan is over 80% by way of biomass (firewood, 
charcoal, grass), especially in the rural areas. But rapid urbanization is also hav-
ing profound effects on forests. Many urban poor rely on firewood collection and 
charcoal burning and this is a driving factor of deforestation around Juba 
(USAID 2007). About 14% of the population is using petroleum products and 
close to 4% of the population is using electricity. The supply is limited to a few 
towns. The installed generation capacity is around 24 MW or about 3 MW per 
million people. This is a tenth of what has been installed in the Eastern African 
region (AfDB 2013). Moreover, frequent breakdowns are undermining the power 
network. For example, Juba is sustained by eight massive generators owned by 
South Sudan Electricity Corporation, with a capacity of up to 11 MW, about half 
of the 2012 demand for power. But in February 2014 seven generators were 
down due to lack of spare parts (Jacomella 2014). 
To promote rural electrification and industrialization the Water Policy of 2007 
suggested the rehabilitation of a small-scale hydro power station in Eastern Equa-
toria State and the development of new hydropower stations focussing on small-
scale rapids such as Aga Falls (GoSS 2007). The 2011-13 Development Plan 
stressed the need for reliable power supply and proposed besides minor hydroe-
lectricity sites a number of major ones notably south of Juba along the White 
Nile (see figure 1). The following five mega hydropower sites with a cumulative 
capacity of 2,590 MW have been identified: Bedden (720 MW), Fula (1,080 
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MW), Lekki (420 MW), Shukoli (250 MW) and Juba barrage (120 MW) (SSDP 
2011-13). Small hydropower plants have also been identified. None of the hy-
dropower sites has been developed as yet. Fula Small Hydropower Plant (40-60 
MW) is intended to supply Juba by 2016 (AfDB 2013: Jacomella 2014).  
 
 
Figure 23 Location of potential hydropower sites 
  
Source: AfDB 2013 
 
 
Diesel units will be put up outside Juba and Malakal while the electricity grids 
of cities will be linked with the Ethiopia-South Sudan and Uganda-South Sudan 
Interconnectors commissioned by the end of 2019 and 2020, respectively. Be-
yond 2025 the formation of a national grid will be  managed by the proposed 
Transmission and Distribution Master Plan. Other policies that have been drafted 
to guide the energy sector are the South Sudan National Electricity Policy Paper 
and National Petroleum Policy. UNDP (2012) commented that wind and solar 
energy did not seem to have a prominent place, but in August 2014 the Govern-
ment announced the Energy Sector Technical Assistance Project that aims to 
boost off-grid solutions including the distribution of solar devices. 
Climate change 
The National Adaptation Plan of Action, which was prepared for the entire Sudan 
before South Sudan became independent, predicts rising temperatures and a de-
crease in rainfall having significant consequences for agriculture, water and 
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health (UNDP 2012). The Sudan Post-Conflict Environmental Assessment by 
UNEP (2007) also identified climate change as one of the most important threats 
to development. However, the report foremost refers to northern parts of Sudan. 
A Ministry of Environment/UNDP report (2012) focussing on South Sudan states 
that rainfall data for South Sudan are scarcely available and no specific climate 
change scenario models have been found, but generally expectations are based on 
regional trends. According to various ministries climate change in South Sudan is 
manifested through:  
 
(1)  Duration and timing of rain becoming erratic, rainy season delayed and 
shorter; 
(2)  Some areas receiving generally less rain, water tables dropping; 
(3)  The desert expanding southward.  
 
The FAO SISFIA project managed to collect data from 1980 onwards but does 
not show a clear change in annual rainfall (Figure 24). 
 
 
Figure 24  Annual rainfall in Juba and Malakal 
  
Source: UNDP 2012  
 
 
By contrast Famine Early Warning researchers of USAID, studying both South 
and North Sudan, claim that rainfall is down by 10-20 percent and temperatures 
up by more than 1 degree Celsius since the mid-1970s (Funk et al. 2011). The 
observed warming is equivalent to another 10-20 percent reduction in rainfall for 
crops. The warming and drying have impacted areas around Juba which threaten 
southern Sudan’s future food production prospects. 
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Figure 25  Smoothed time series of June through September 
rainfall, actual evapotranspiration, and average air 
temperature for the southern Sudan region 
 
Source: Funk et al. (2011) 
 
 
Figure 26  Climate change in Sudan 
 
 
Figure 26. Climate change in Sudan. A) Average location of the 500-millimeter rainfall 
isohyets for the years 1960-1989 (light brown), 1990-2009 (dark brown), and 2010-
2039 (predicted, orange). The green polygons in the foreground show the main crop 
surplus region (the Green Belt livelihood zone) and the agro-pastoral Ironstone Plateau 
and Hills and Mountains livelihood zones. B) Similar changes for the 30 Celsius 
isotherm. Areas north of this line are very hot; this intense heat makes plant growth and 
pastoral livelihoods difficult.  
Source: Funk et al. 2011. 
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In the 2011-2013 Development Plan climate change hardly features. Also in 
the State specific priority setting attention is foremost directed towards the need 
for security and basic infrastructure, education, health and food security. Only 
Eastern Equatorial State mentions that food security is hampered due to droughts 
and floods, besides diseases and a lack of inputs, skills, irrigation and markets.  
Pressing Needs 
* Measures to deal with population movements  
South Sudan is among the least populated countries in Africa. However, the huge 
influx of returnees as well as the large numbers of IDPs due to conflicts within 
the country puts severe pressures on water resources in certain areas, notably in 
the fast growing urban centres. Likewise during periods of drought, which might 
increase in the years ahead due to rising temperatures and dropping rain quanti-
ties, especially pastoralists face problems over access to water for their herds, 
leading to additional local resource conflicts. These conflicts could sometimes be 
prevented through provision of water sources. Yet care has to be taken as new 
water sources may also trigger battles over newly opened grazing areas. Decent 
studies and thorough consultations by all potentially involved groups should be 
done ahead of providing new water schemes in these settings. 
As long as Nile waters stream into South Sudan at current rates the country is 
not water stressed or water scarce. However, without the Nile waters South Su-
dan would be water stressed from 2015 onwards (see tables 3 and 4).  
 
 
Table 3  Sudan (Medium variant) 2015-2025 
Year Population Population  Period Population  
 (’000) density (pop/km2)  growth rate% 
2015 12 152 19 2005-2010 4.25 
2020 13 853 20 2010-2015 4.02 
2025 15571 24 2015-2020 2.62 
   2020-2025 2.34 
Source: Source: http://esa.un.org/unpd/wpp/unpp/panel_population.htm 
 
Table 4  Availability of water in South Sudan 2012-2025 
South Sudan 2012 2015 2025 
Total renewable water (109m3/yr) 49.5   
Total renewable per capita (m3/cap/yr) 4567 4073 3166 
Source: http://www.unep.org/pdf/africa_water_atlas.pdf; FAO Aquastat author’s calculation   
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* Maintaining water as a government priority (in competition with other needs) 
Several government and donor groups have been soliciting views and ideas 
among communities and professionals which actions should be given priority to 
improve the well-being of the people of South Sudan. A World Food Programme 
survey among local communities gave seven top priorities: health ser-
vices/assistance (31 percent), food assistance (24 percent), water provision (10 
percent), education services (8 percent), security and peace (8 percent), agricul-
tural inputs (6 percent) and road construction (5 percent). 
By contrast, a 2013 World Bank survey among individuals working in gov-
ernment and non-government circles in South Sudan enquired about the most 
pressing needs the country was facing. Some bias existed towards the back-
ground of the respondents (mostly in education) and location (Equatorial states), 
but the outcome revealed that for specific themes such as poverty reduction, eco-
nomic growth, general development as well as the sector the World Bank should 
work in, education was among the top three in each case. Other priorities men-
tioned were foremost agriculture, security, transport and health (World Bank 
2013b). Water and sanitation scored from place 13 up to 20. However, profes-
sionals with a background in water were mostly lacking. It seems that the abun-
dance of (Nile) water and reasonable precipitation is sufficient (for the moment 
and in most places). However, the government has earmarked the water and sani-
tation sector as one of its six priority areas in the 2011-2013 development plan. 
In the next 5 to 10 years an annual doubling of new rural water supply schemes 
(from 300 to 600) through hand-dug wells (5%), boreholes with hand pumps 
(75%), water yards (10%) and surface sources (e,g, ponds) (10%) is aimed for 
(AfDB 2013). In addition, rehabilitation of existing schemes and reducing non-
functionality of schemes is a priority.  
 
* Smart operation and maintenance  
There is an urgent need to build local capacity. Selection of smart technologies 
will be crucial. It is estimated that about 11,000 new rural water supply schemes 
will be constructed to attain access levels of 65% by 2020 (AfDB 2013). A major 
challenge will be to come up with sustainable formats of both operation and 
maintenance. The AfDB doubts whether this can be done by local communities 
though, and it calls for the private sector to step in. 
In the urban setting, a mix of surface and ground water will be used to supply 
the state capitals. In another group of at last 50 small towns the use of water 
yards is suggested. This should improve water access from 15 to 70% by 2020. 
Lack of investment funds (needed: US$ 2 bn), and internal or external conflicts 
will undermine development of the water and sanitation situation in the country. 
 
  
35 
* Knowledge and data gathering on climate change and wetlands management  
Given i) the growing demand by upstream countries as well as by South Sudan 
itself for expansion of water use in agriculture (irrigation), ii) the Jonglei canal 
question and iii) other uncertainties linked to the Nile Basin Treaty, knowledge 
gathering of the impacts of these water demanding developments is crucial. For a 
better understanding of climate change in South Sudan it is also essential to im-
prove data gathering. 
 
* Other pressing needs South Sudan: 
-  Water for arid zones to overcome conflicts over water resources  
-  Need for proper understanding of the issues at stake as water development could 
open up new grazing areas and cause more problems over the long run  
-  Water/sanitation especially for fast growing urban centres and for IDPs (smart 
technologies) 
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